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The aviation and aerospace law and policy arenas saw significant changes during the year
2001. As with all other aspects of life throughout the world, in addition to the general
trends of development and evolution that naturally occur within the space of a year, these
two areas experienced a drastic surge in activity in reaction to the tragic events of September
11. On the U.S. domestic side, Congress proposed, negotiated, and passed landmark leg-
islation in record time as a direct response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, including two primary pieces of legislation impacting the aviation
industry. Other events captured ongoing dialogues relating to other key pieces of legislative
or regulatory efforts, such as the Death on the High Seas Act and its application to certain
aspects of the aviation industry.
Meanwhile, the trend towards increasing the attention paid to space law and policy-
evidenced by the release of a congressionally created Commission report in January 2001
focusing on the interplay between space management and organization and national secu-
rity-continued. The trend was drawn into sharper focus as the need to determine the role
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of space in the twenty-first century became more critical as a result of September 11 and
the changing nature of the threats posed to democracy and free market theory by terrorism
and anti-American sentiment. The aerospace industry continued to experience tremendous
fluidity as a result of legislative and regulatory initiatives, as well as economic and other
market-based factors. Technology transfer concerns continued to shape and impact the
industry, particularly in the satellite sector, which witnessed a continuing decline of U.S.
market share attributable in part to the jurisdictional shift over commercial satellites from
the U.S. Department of Commerce to the U.S. Department of State.
I. Aviation Law
The two primary pieces of legislation passed post-September 11 affecting the aviation
industry are the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act' (the Stabilization
Act) and the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA).2
A. AIR TRANSPORTATION SAFETY AND SYSTEM STABILIZATION ACT
The Stabilization Act was drafted, passed by Congress and signed into public law on
September 22, 2001-immediately after the terrorist attacks. It was designed to "preserve
the continued viability of the United States air transportation system."' To accomplish this,
the Act provided for immediate financial relief to the aviation industry in the form of grants
and loans, it established a framework for the computation of the maximum grant that an
airline could claim as compensation, and it established the Air Transportation Stabilization
Board to review the prospective loan applications. The Act also established the September
1 lth Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 to directly deal with the needs of September 1 lth
victims' families for financial assistance and to provide an alternative to the families of
having to proceed with litigation and to wait long periods of time to receive compensation.
Further, the Act contained a provision to address the possible effects on the insurance and
aviation industry should claimants proceed with litigation. Particularly, the Stabilization
Act limits the airlines' liability to the extent of the available insurance, thus protecting the
insurance industry as well as the aviation industry.
1. Victim Compensation
The Act is notable for its creation of a compensation fund, the proceeds of which are
earmarked for distribution to victims of September 11.4 As the Stabilization Act provides,
a Special Master will oversee the administration of the Victim Compensation Fund.' The
fund allows for claims of individuals who were present and physically injured at one of the
three accident sites, namely, the Pentagon, the World Trade Center, and the crash site in
Pennsylvania of the fourth plane involved in the terrorist attacks of September 11. If claim-
ants decide to proceed under the Victim Compensation Fund claim awards must be paid
within 120 days of the claim's submission.
1. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. 107-42, 115 Star. 230 (2001) [hereinafter
Stabilization Act].
2. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001) [hereinafter ATSA].
3. See Stabilization Act, supra note 1.
4. September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 (title IV of Pub. L. 107-42; 49 U.S.C. 40101 note).
5. Regulations for the fund had not yet been finalized as of the writing of this paper.
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One identified stumbling block to all claimants submitting claims under the fund, as set
out in the preliminary regulations appears to be the reduction of any award by the amount
of any collateral sources, such as pensions or life insurance proceeds. If a claimant files a
claim with the Victim Compensation Fund, the claimant is precluded from civil litigation.
6
If the claimant does decide to proceed with a lawsuit, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions. Also,
punitive damages are not recoverable under the Fund. Would-be claimants have up to two
years after December 21, 2001 in which to file a claim.
It will be interesting to watch how many individuals proceed with litigation and what
theories of liability they will put forth. There have already been several lawsuits filed against
the airlines involved, and it is anticipated that additional lawsuits will be filed against the
security companies who contracted with the airline companies for airport security, and
perhaps the airport authorities as well. As expected and in keeping with responses to prior
terrorist attacks such as the downing of Pan Am 103, there has already been litigation filed
against various terrorist organizations and Osama bin Laden in his personal capacity.
2. Air Carrier Compensation
The Stabilization Act also made funds available to the President to compensate air car-
riers for direct losses suffered as a result of any federal ground stop order and incremental
losses beginning September 11, 2001 and ending December 31, 2001, resulting from the
September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States. A maximum of $4.5 billion was
earmarked to serve as an immediate cash payment to compensate passenger and combi-
nation (passenger and cargo) carriers; a maximum total of $500 million was set aside ac-
cordingly for all-cargo carriers. The Stabilization Act also provided for an additional $10
billion in loan guarantees to carriers in accordance with the Federal Credit Reform Act.7
Under the Stabilization Act, the distribution of the compensation was designed as follows:
a U.S. passenger or combination carrier is entitled to the lesser of (1) its actual direct and
incremental damages or (2) the product of (i) $4.5 billion and (ii) a ratio of (a) the available
seat miles of the carrier in August 2001, as reported to the Department of Transportation
(DOT), to (b) the total available seat miles of all passenger and combination carriers as
reported for August 2001.8 Accordingly, all domestic all-cargo carriers are entitled to the
lesser of (1) its actual direct and incremental damages or (2) the product of (i) $500 million
and (ii) a ratio of (a) "the revenue ton miles or other auditable measure of the air carrier
for cargo for the last quarter for which data is available" as reported to the DOT, to (b) the
total revenue ton miles or other auditable measure for all such all-cargo carriers for such
quarter as reported to the DOT 9
In order to fulfill Congress' intent to expeditiously provide compensation to eligible air
carriers, the DOT moved quickly and used procedures first set out in Program Guidance
Letters in an attempt to make initial estimated payments amounting to about 50 percent
of the authorized funds. 10 On October 18, 2001, the DOT posted a statement of payments
6. Claimants filing under the Stabilization Act will not be precluded from filing a civil action against
terrorists or terrorist organizations. See ATSA, supra note 2.
7. Id. § 101(a)(1).
8. Id. § 103(b)(2)(A).
9. Id. § 103(b)(2)(B).
10. Department of Transportation, Program Guidance Letter 01, Oct. 1, 2001, available at http://
www.dot.gov/carriers.html (last visited June 26, 2002).
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to carriers totaling over $2.4 billion." These initial payments ranged from over $390 million
for United Air Lines, Inc., to a mere $777 for Daystar Airways. 2
On October 29, 2001, the DOT published the first of three orders establishing the
regulations regarding carrier compensation and it requested comments on these rules.13
These rules were promulgated in Part 330 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 14
On January 2, 2002, the DOT published amendments to the final rule (the Second Round
Rules) responding to comments and establishing a deadline for submitting applications by
indirect air carriers and wet lessors-or carriers that provide aircraft, crew, maintenance,
and insurance (ACMI) to another air carrier. 5 On February 1, 2002, the DOT further
amended the final rule to allow additional time for indirect air carriers and wet lessors to
submit applications for compensation. 6 On April 11, 2002, the Department released a third
order revising and amending the compensation rules (the Third Round Rules). 7
The Third Round Rules amended the former rules to require that a new or "third round"
application be filed in order for an eligible carrier to receive 95 percent of the compensation
for which it was due. All carriers that previously had submitted a claim (including those
that had received partial compensation) must file a new application under the amended
rules using a revised Form 330. Significantly, eligibility for third round (95 percent) com-
pensation required the submission of an independent public accountant's (IPA) report and
financial statements for the monthsJuly 2001 throughJanuary 2002. The Departmentalso
set forth a simplified procedure to avoid the IPA report, but it applied only to all-cargo
carriers with fewer than two million RTMs in Q2 2001.
In the Third Round Rule, the Department deleted the provisions that required wet
lessors and indirect air carriers to document the fact that other carriers (wet lessees or direct
carriers, respectively) had not or would not duplicitously claim RTMs. Further, the DOT
stated that U.S. indirect carriers may claim RTMs flown for them by foreign direct carriers.
The Third Round Rules also clarified that losses experienced before September 11, 2001,
and after December 31, 2001, were not compensable. Such non-qualified claims of loss
would include the devaluation of aircraft and other assets (impairment charges) based on
an expectation of their diminished value after the attacks." Carriers were to bear the burden
of showing that such charges were "fully borne within the September 11 to December 31
period and are permanent, and that compensation for those costs would not be duplica-
tive."' 19 In such cases, the DOT would consider such claims on a case-by-case basis.
11. Department of Transportation, List of Carrier Payments, available at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/
carrierpayments.hun (last visited Apr. 10, 2001).
12. Id.
13. Department of Transportation, Procedures for Compensation of Air Carriers, Final Rule, 14 C.F.R. pt.
330 (2001).
14. Id.
15. Procedures for Compensation of Air Carriers, 67 Fed. Reg. 250 Gan. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. pt. 330).
16. Procedures for Compensation of Air Carriers, 67 Fed. Reg. 4899 (Feb. 1, 2002).
17. Procedures for Compensation of Air Carriers, 67 Fed. Reg. 18,468 (Apr. 16, 2002).
18. The Department has significant amount of opposition regarding certain aspects of its compensation
rules. See, e.g., Federal Express Corp. v. Department of Transportation, Docket No. 01-1190, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit (filed June 14, 2002).
19. Procedures for Compensation of Air Carriers, supra note 17.
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B. AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which was passed subsequent to
the Stabilization Act, established a new Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to
oversee transportation security in all sectors of transportation. The TSA is responsible for
identifying and implementing changes in processes, systems, and behavior that will keep
the U.S. transportation system secure. Immediately, its mission is the replacement of se-
curity personnel in airports with newly trained federal employees.
ATSA also amended the Stabilization Act to allow civil actions against "any person who
is a knowing participant in any conspiracy to hijack any aircraft or commit any terrorist
act."20 ATSA also amended Section 408 of the Stabilization Act by limiting the liability of
air carriers, aircraft manufacturers, airport sponsors or persons with a property interest in
the World Trade Center to an amount not greater than the limits of liability insurance
coverage maintained by these entities. It also limited the liability of New York City to the
city's insurance coverage, or $350 million.
C. OTHER LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY ITEMS
1. Death on the High Seas Act
Congress enacted the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)21 to provide a remedy to
families who lost loved ones at sea. DOHSA has been the source of much litigation, par-
ticularly with respect to its application to aviation accidents. DOHSA applied to accidents
more than a marine league from shore-approximately three nautical miles. This DOHSA
provision became a source of contention following several major aviation accidents, in-
cluding the TWA Flight 800 accident in 1996. DOHSA, if applicable, only allows recovery
for pecuniary damages.
The TWA Flight 800 crash occurred about eight miles from the coast of Long Island,
more than the three nautical miles allowed by DOHSA. The families of Flight 800's pas-
sengers filed suit against Trans World Airlines and others in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York. Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claims of non-
pecuniary damages, claiming DOHSA barred said damages. Plaintiffs argued that
Presidential Proclamation No. 5928 issued in 1988 by President Reagan, which provided
for the extension of territorial seas to twelve nautical miles, should be applicable or
determinative of whether this crash occurred on the high seas or not. Judge Robert W
Sweet denied the motion to dismiss, and defendants appealed to the Second Circuit. In a
lengthy opinion,22 the Second Circuit upheld Judge Sweet's ruling, finding that the term
"high seas" under DOHSA meant "waters where no nation is sovereign,"23 and thus if the
Court applied DOHSA to territorial waters it would be subverting the purpose of DOHSA.
The Court found that President Reagan's Proclamation extended the three-mile boundary,
which had previously been applied, and, thus, the TWA families would be entitled to non-
pecuniary damages.
Because of the recent aviation disasters that occurred over the water, such as TWA 800,
Swissair Flight 11 and EgyptAir 990, Congress finally amended DOHSA in 2000. Section
20. ATSA, supra note 2, § 20 1(a).
21. Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. App. § 761 (1994).
22. In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York, 209 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2000).
23. Id.
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404 of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment Reform Act amended Sections 761 and
762 of DOHSA for the 21 st Century (Air 21).24 This legislation was signed on April 5,2000
and is applicable to DOHSA for deaths resulting from commercial aviation accidents that
occurred after July 16, 1996.25
The congressional committees conducting hearings on the DOHSA amendment noted
the inequities that families suffer should their loved ones die in an aircraft accident which
crashes into the sea as opposed to those whose loved ones die in a plane crash on land.
Noting the fortuitous nature of air travel, it was recognized that it is a matter of chance
where a plane crashes, and thus a family's rights depended on pure chance.26 Thus, the
amendment first provides that DOHSA is no longer controlling in aviation accidents arising
out of crashes into the high seas, and defined now as twelve nautical miles or closer to the
shore of any state." Should the crash occur more than twelve nautical miles away from the
shore, then DOHSA was further amended to allow the recovery of nonpecuniary damages-
specifically defined as damages for loss of care, comfort and companionship. Also, the
amendment retained the DOHSA provision denying recovery for punitive damages.
Following the amendment of DOHSA, in a case which had been pending in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, plaintiffs representing the family
of a pilot whose helicopter crashed in the Gulf of Mexico approximately twenty-five miles
southeast of Galveston filed a motion requesting that if DOHSA applied, that it would
apply as amended. This would give the plaintiffs the right to recover non-pecuniary dam-
ages. Plaintiffs argued that the helicopter accident flight was "commercial aviation" and
therefore would fall under the DOHSA amendment. Citing to the Federal Aviation Reg-
ulations, plaintiffs maintained that commercial aviation should be defined broadly as all air
carriage performed for compensation or hire. At the time of the accident, the pilot was
working for Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. and was operating the helicopter as an air taxi for
hire under Part 135. Defendants argued to the contrary-that Congress intended the term
"commercial aviation accident" to mean commercial airline disasters, not helicopter or
general aviation aircraft.
Plaintiffs also argued that the case fell under the retroactive provision of the amendment
to DOHSA, since the accident was after July 16, 1996 (the date of the accident was No-
vember 28, 1996). Defendants attempted to argue that the retroactive application of the
amendment was unconstitutional.
Judge Samuel Kent granted the plaintiffs' motion. ' s Judge Kent only dealt with the issue
of the definition of commercial aviation. Going back to basics, the court looked at the
words "commercial" and "commercial activities."29 Both definitions included a connection
with commerce or an activity that is carried on for profit. The court also accepted a standard
definition of the term "aviation," which was defined as "the operation of heavier-than-air
24. Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21 st Century, Pub. L. 106-181, 114 Stat.
61 (2000).
25. The date is one day before the T'NA Flight 800 accident.
26. H. R. REP. No. 106-32 (1999) (To Clarify the Application of the Act Popularly Known as the "Death
on the High Seas Act" to Aviation Accidents).
27. DOHSA previously applied to accidents occurring more than a marine league from shore-approxi-
mately three nautical miles.
28. See Brown v. Eurocopter, Ill F. Supp. 2d 859 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
29. The judge relied on the terms' standard definitions, as set forth in reference materials such as Black's
Law Dictionary.
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aircraft."o In its reasoning, the court found that since PHI's business was to provide cus-
tomers with on-demand air taxi service using heavier-than-air helicopters, the flight which
ended in the accident was part of PHI's commercial operations. Thus, the accident would
be governed by the now amended DOHSA provision. Judge Kent also noted that he did
not believe that Congress meant to favor victims of international commercial air accidents
over victims of commercial aviation accidents in general. The court neither addressed nor
commented on the issue of retroactivity of the amendment.
2. Warsaw Convention
Under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention creating air carrier liability, the Convention
sets out the circumstances under which an air carrier may be liable for injuries to passengers.
Article 17 provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a
passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the
damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations
of embarking or disembarking.
Therefore for an air carrier to be liable for injuries, a plaintiff must establish that:
(a) There has been an "accident;"
(b) That the passenger suffered death, wounding or bodily injury; and
(c) That the accident either took place on board the aircraft or in the course of operations
of embarking or disembarking.
The Supreme Court in Air France v. Saks defined the term "accident" as an injury "caused
by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger."3' The
definitions of "accident" and "bodily injury" are the focus of recent Warsaw Convention
decisions. A few of the following cases highlight the confusion amongst the courts as to the
meaning of these phrases.
In Langadinos v. American Airlines, Inc.,32 the First Circuit found no accident where a male
passenger alleged another male passenger sexually assaulted him. However, in Wallace v.
Korean Air," the Second Circuit reversed finding no accident where one passenger sexually
assaulted a fellow passenger during an international flight. Interestingly, the Second Circuit
found that the "characteristics of air travel," such as sitting in a confined space next to
strangers and in an unsupervised location, increased plaintiff's vulnerability to the assault
and that was considered to be an accident under Article 17.
The Second Circuit in Sethy v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, Inc.14 affirmed the lower court's
ruling that a trip and fall over another passenger's bag on the floor of an aircraft during
the boarding process was not an accident under Article 17. Following the Saks case, the
Court declined to recognize an Article 17 accident where not only was the cause of the
accident not a risk characteristic of air travel, but it did not relate to the operation of
the aircraft or the acts of the crew members. Because the plaintiff in this case could not
show that there was any act or omission by the airline cabin crew, the Court did not find
30. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 80 (10th ed. 1995).
31. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
32. Langadinos v. American Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000).
33. Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1079 (2001).
34. Sethy v. Malev-Hungarian Airlines, Inc., 2001 WL 668586 (2d Cir. 2001).
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that the incident was a departure from the normal boarding process was thus not an accident
under Article 17. However, a passenger opening up a luggage bin above her seat causing a
bag of liquor bottles to drop on her head was found to be an accident in Maxwell v. Aer
Lingus Ltd." The Court found that because the event was "unexpected and unusual" and
related to the characteristic risks of air travel as airlines provide the storage of items in the
overhead bin for the passengers' amenity, that the injuries were caused by an accident under
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.
H. Aerospace and Space Law and Policy
The year 2001 was one fraught with advancements and significant developments in the
area of aerospace/space law and policy. As is always the case in this area, the legal and policy
issues were often shaped, driven and/or guided by technologically driven objectives or ad-
vancements. Many technological achievements reached during 2001 were awe-inspiring in
their advancement of research and science, such as the benchmarks reached by the inno-
vative and experimental X-33 and X-34 programs (even though both programs were can-
celled by NASA in 2001) and the Air Force's Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle programs
(which gave birth to Lockheed Martin's Atlas 5 launch vehicle and Boeing's Delta 4). Also
notable in 2001 were other milestones of a different nature entirely-ranging from the
release of an expansive U.S. Commission Report on U.S. national security intentions on
use and management of outer space to the lofty aspirations of American millionaire Dennis
Tito, which were realized when he paid his way into outer space aboard a Russian Soyuz
rocket for a visit to the International Space Station.
Over the past several years the continuing trend of the world in general was to focus
more and more on outer space and its uses as access to space became more available through
both intergovernmental and private sector efforts. International treaty-based organiza-
tions-formed in an era where no one independent nation was fully capable of dominating
space access or exploitation-gave way to a privatization overhaul as commercial space start-
ups became more established and began successfully challenging the state-sponsored mo-
nopolies that until recently dominated the markets they had been created to establish.
Entities began seeking ways to exploit and market outer space, from selling pieces of the
moon to taking advance payments for private citizen seating on space transports yet to be
built (or, for that matter, found technologically feasible). The U.S. Government was no
exception: the U.S. military had made known in 2000 its intention to put outer space and
its use at the forefront of its focus in formulating its strategy for the future of the U.S.
national security. 6 Moreover, in the early days of his administration, President George W.
Bush announced his intentions to seek the establishment of a national missile defense shield,
leading U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to expressly urge that space exploration be
devoted solely to peaceful pursuits, such as environmental monitoring, not to the waging
of war.
But the year marking the fortieth anniversary of the first human flight into outer space,
that of Yuri Gagarin's single orbit around our planet Earth in 1961, and the twentieth
35. Maxwell v. Aer Lingus Ltd., 122 F. Supp. 2d 210 (D. Mass. 2000).
36. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Defense Space Technology Guide 2000-2001, available at https://
www.space.gov (last visited June 26, 2002) ("Space-based capabilities are integral to the U.S.'s national security
operational doctrines and processes.").
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anniversary of the United States Space Shuttle will be most remembered for the events of
September 11. And no doubt it will be the tragic events of that day, along with the ongoing
United States and international efforts to wage and win the declared war on terrorism,
which will emerge as a pivotal point in shaping the policies and strategies, as well as the
laws, of the United States and other space faring countries with regard to the use, man-
agement and exploitation of outer space in the twenty-first century.
A. THE COMMISSION TO AssEss U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE MANAGEMENT
AND ORGANIZATION
In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000, the
Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization (Space
Commission) issued its final report in January 200 1.1 The report conveyed the Commis-
sion's findings in fulfillment of its statutory charter to "assess the organization and man-
agement of space activities that support U.S. national security interests," including taking
into account the scope and functions of space activities addressed by the 1996 National
Space Policy." In addition, the report also considered civil and commercial space-based
activities and assessed their relationship to and effect on national security.3 9 The Commis-
sion's conclusions included identification of five matters of key importance, viz.: (1) U.S.
national security space interests must be recognized as a top national security priority; (2) an
overall re-organization of the U.S. institutional structure governing space management and
organization is necessary; (3) development and deployment of space capabilities in war, crisis
and peace required a close relationship of responsibility and accountability for space ca-
pabilities by and between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence;
(4) development of means to deter and defend against hostile acts via space is necessary for
the United States to maintain and ensure continued superiority in space; and (5) investment
in science and technology assets is essential to maintain the position of the United States
as the world's leading space-faring nation.4°
The initially designated chair of the Commission, Donald H. Rumsfeld, recused himself
and stepped down from this position in December 2000 when he was nominated for the
position of Secretary of Defense by then President-elect George W Bush. After assuming
his role as defense secretary, Rumsfeld adopted the majority of the recommendations set
forth in the Commission's report. The recommendations laid out a comprehensive orga-
nizational approach, considering and discussing effects in the short-term, mid-term, and
long-term. As an example, one of the key tenets of the Commission's report included an
overhaul of the U.S. Government's approach to management and organization of its space
policy and decision-making structure. A serious revamping of the current structure would
clearly result in an immediate impact with long-reaching effects on the nation's space pol-
icies through the twenty-first century. By early 2002, Rumsfeld had already acted on the
37. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. 106-65, § 1623 (2000).
38. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security, Space Management and Orga-
nization (an. 11, 2001), available at https://www.space.gov [hereinafter Space Commission Report].
39. Id. at 2 (commenting that the United States is vulnerable to a "space Pearl Harbor" strike against
satellites and stating "[slpecifically, the U.S. must have the capability to use space as an integral part of its
ability to manage crises, deter conflicts and, if deterrence fails, to prevail in conflict.").
40. Id. at 9-10.
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Commission's overarching recommendation, implementing a number of steps to consoli-
date authority and accountability for the creation and implementation of space policy and
strategy by the defense and intelligence communities. It can be anticipated that the Com-
mission's findings, as laid out in its report, and adoption by the Administration of even just
a few of those findings, will significantly impact key decisions regarding the U.S. Govern-
ment's approach to the use, management and exploitation of outer space over the next
decade and longer.
B. THE NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
After tenure of nine-and-a-half years, Dan Goldin stepped down from his position as
Administrator for the often beleaguered and struggling National Air and Space Adminis-
tration (NASA). Sean O'Keefe, then deputy director of the Office of Management and
Budget, was tapped by the Bush administration to step in to take over the reins. O'Keefe
previously served as Secretary of the Navy for the first Bush's administration and also
worked for Vice President Dick Cheney when Cheney was defense secretary in the 1990s.4 1
The agency, tasked to service the civilian space policy needs of the U.S. Government,
accomplishes its objectives through management of various space, aeronautics, science and
technology programs. In fiscal year 2000 the agency's budget was approximately $13.58
billion. Over the past decade NASA's focus has been on the programs designated as top
priority missions, including, operation of the Space Shuttle program, development and
operation of the International Space Station and continued maintenance of a strong pro-
gram of science and technology management.
For NASA, the year 2001 marked a number of significant technological successes: the
first year of continuous habitation of the International Space Station (ISS), six launches of
the space shuttle, integration of the U.S. Destiny Laboratory Module and installation of a
new joint airlock on the ISS that enabled crew members to conduct space walks independent
of the presence of either the space shuttle or Soyuz spacecraft. Nevertheless, the year also
saw the continuation of a tumultuous and often controversial period of the civilian space
agency's existence, with budget cuts and political pressures exerting tremendous pressure
on NASA's decisional and organizational processes.
1. International Space Station
In early 2001 NASA was forced to admit that the International Space Station (ISS) cost
overruns exceeded its remaining budget by as much as $4 billion-a number that alarmed
the new Administration, particularly when it shortly thereafter grew to $4.8 billion and was
projected to reach over $5 billion by the summer.
NASA's budget overruns caused newly inaugurated President Bush to call for a halt in
continuing cash flow from the United States to the ISS program. Under considerable pres-
sure from the Bush administration, NASA slimmed down the projected overrun to $500
million by significantly cutting back NASA's contributions to the ISS, much to the dismay
of the fifteen other nation-states party to the ISS partnership.42
41. Marcia Dunn, A Relentless Cost-Cutter Tapped to Head Troubled NASA, Assoc. PRESS NEWSWIRE, Nov.
15, 2001).
42. Among other cutbacks, NASA shelved a habitation module and a seven-person crew rescue vehicle,
effectively scaling the International Space Station (ISS) into a three-person facility.
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These controversial actions prompted complaints from many of the other ISS partner
countries, most notably several European countries, who asserted that the 1995 interna-
tional agreement entered into by and among the sixteen ISS partner countries committed
NASA to making financial contributions.43 For example, in its first-ever parliamentary
debate on French space policy, the French parliament strenuously objected to any European
partners making fresh funding commitments to make up for the Bush administration's
decision."
Nevertheless, with the ISS in orbit and operational, in addition to its significance as a
testimonial to international partnership with regard to space-based cooperation, NASA's
continued participation with the ISS program is not in serious jeopardy. What will be
unclear, however, is the United States' continued dominance with regard to the ISS as the
other nation partners' investment and participation in the program continue being shaped
and/or impacted by NASA's fluctuating level of commitment to the station. It will be in-
teresting to observe over the coming years the impact of global focus on addressing ter-
rorism, and how the role of space use with regard to those efforts will influence the space
station's role in advancing civilian space-based research and development efforts.
2. Reusable Launch Vehicles
The year also saw the demise of two experimental programs involving reusable launch
vehicles (RLV). Funding for the X-33 and X-44 programs was shut off, effectively killing
off both programs. Development of RLVs, however, remained a stated priority goal for
NASA. The decision to retain RLV development as a priority goal is critical for shaping
the future of U.S. space transportation, as the RLV program remains the designated heir
of the U.S. space shuttle program. To that end, in December NASA stated its intention to
continue forward alone with the X-37 program despite announcements from Boeing and
the U.S. Air Force that they would not invest any additional fumding of their own into
the program. 41
In May, NASA kicked off its $5 billion Space Launch Initiative, which allowed for nearly
$800 million to a number of U.S. companies and universities for technology development
and systems engineering relating to RLV research and development. NASA deferred until
2006 its decision as to whether technology is at a state that would allow the construction
of an RLV capable of replacing the space shuttle.
3. Astronomical/Scientific Payloads
NASA's astronomical and scientific programs saw a slow and steady report of mostly
successes throughout 2001. The agency's Mars Global Surveyor capped its fourth year in
Mars' orbit, conveying its 100,000th image of the red planet's surface. In October 2001,
the Mars Odyssey spacecraft (launched on April 7) joined the Surveyor in orbit around
Mars. February saw the landing of the Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR) probe on
the surface of an asteroid-the first such landing ever. In addition, December 6 saw the
43. International Space Station Authorization Act of 1995, H.R. 1601, 104th Cong. 1 (1995).
44. Peter B. de Selding, French Senate Urges No NASA Bailoutfor Station, SPACE NFws, Dec. 17, 2001, at 14.
45. The X-37 is an autonomous winged space vehicle capable of achieving orbit either from launching on
an expendable rocket or deploying from the payload bay of an in-orbit space shuttle. See Brian Singer &Jeremy
Berger, NASA Commits to X-37 Flight, SPACE NEws, Dec. 3, 2001, at 1.
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successful launching of the Jason- 1 spacecraft, notable primarily due to its partnership status
with the French.-
NASA did suffer the loss of the Quick Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer spacecraft as
a result of a launch failure on September 21, but otherwise, its scientific programs were
chalked up as successful.
C. MILITARY Focus RELATING TO OUTER SPACE
1. Re-structuring of U.S. Space Command and Control Structure
In May, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced a reorganization of the De-
partment of Defense's space command and control structure. With a few exceptions, the
restructuring essentially paralleled the recommendations laid out in a report made to Con-
gress in January 2001 by the Commission to Assess United States National Security, Space
Management and Organization, which had been chaired by Rumsfeld himself until he was
appointed Secretary of Defense by newly elected President George W. Bush.47
In addition to fortifying the Air Force Space Command in Colorado Springs, Colorado,
Rumsfeld also announced his intent to place a four-star general in charge of designing and
executing space programs and operations.48 The restructuring consolidated all military
space programs into two inter-locking commands. The Air Force was given full "respon-
sibility to organize, train and equip for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive space
operations." 49 The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was tasked with
undertaking "research and demonstration of innovative space technologies and systems for
dedicated military missions." 0
In recent years, the U.S. military had begun focusing on space as the next potential theater
of engagement. Air Force General Ralph E. Eberhart, then serving as the commander-in-
chief for U.S. Space Command, had long served as a proponent for the need to commit
more resources and focus to addressing the development of space, both for military and
commercial purposes.5'
Critics of Rumsfeld's statements and President Bush's outspoken support for a National
Missile Defense system have pointed to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty as prohibitions on any plans of the United States to pursue what
has been termed the "militarization of space."52 It should be noted, however, that both the
Outer Space Treaty and the ABM Treaty do not overtly prohibit space-based weapons or
the development of technology intended to render harmless or destroy space-based weap-
ons. While debate may exist regarding the full interpretation and intent of the language
contained in these and other international agreements, at best agreement can only be un-
disputed with regard to limitation of some military-based activities in space.
46. Jason-1 is a joint United States-French mission to monitor oceanographic wave heights and circulation.
47. For example, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld elected not to follow the Commission's recommendation to
create a new post of Undersecretary of Defense for space, intelligence and information.
48. Norman Kempster, Rumsfeld Lays Out a Strategy For Space Military, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 2001, at Al.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Sandra I. Erwin, U.S. Space Command Chief Warns About Technical Complacency, NAT'L DEFENSE, May 1,
2001, available at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org (last visited June 26, 2002).
52. See, e.g., Michael Hedges, U.S. Defense Plan Triggers Concern of Space Warfare, HOUSTON CHRON., May
9, 2001.
VOL. 36, NO. 2
AVIATION AND AEROSPACE: LAW AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 519
2. Space Assets
Technical problems continued to plague several high-profile projects during 2001, in-
cluding the Pentagon's planned next generation of missile warning spacecraft: the Space
Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Program.53 Originally planned for launch of the pay-
loads by 2002, delays have shifted launch initiations to 2006 and are believed to have in-
creased the original cost by nearly 2.5 billion USD.5 4 The SBIRS spacecraft are intended
to replace the Defense Support Program satellite fleet, which also utilize infrared sensors
to detect the heat plumes of missiles shortly after they have been launched."
D. LEGISLATivE/REGuLATORY ISSUES
1. Technology Transfer
Not surprisingly, the rules and regulations governing technology transfer received sig-
nificant attention from the commercial space industry. In particular, determining which
U.S. governmental agency constituted the most appropriate one to administer export con-
trols over commercial satellites remained controversial throughout 2001. The U.S. satellite
industry continued to denounce the shift of jurisdiction from the U.S. Department of Com-
merce back to the U.S. Department of State (which was effected in 1999 via congressional
mandate)-thus subjecting commercial satellites to the International Traffic in Arms Reg-
ulations (ITAR) rather than the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Many U.S.
private sector representatives voiced their belief that the application of the ITAR to com-
mercial satellites was an instrumental factor in exacerbating their struggles within the
marketplace, adversely impacting their competitiveness vis--vis non-U.S. spacecraft man-
ufacturers.
5 6
One situation receiving significant attention is the scenario created by the Apstar 5 sat-
ellite, under contract to California-based satellite manufacturer Space Systems/Loral from
APT Satellite Co., Ltd., an Asian company with significant Chinese government ownership.
In December, issues surrounding SS/Loral's inability to obtain licensing authority from the
U.S. State Department to ship the satellite to China for launch by the Chinese-built
LongMarch launch vehicle led APT Satellite to release a request for proposals on the street
for a back-up replacement satellite for Apstar 5.7
The 2001 Space Commission predicted that the United States would be tested over time
by, among other things, attempts by other nations to restrict U.S. space activities through
international regulations.18 The United States continues to struggle with resolving the ten-
sions created from the necessity of balancing its national security concerns-as implemented
through, among other things, its technology transfer mandates-with its need to ensure
the continued viability and competitiveness of the U.S. commercial space sector. As it con-
tinues to work on resolving these critical issues, it should be kept in mind that continued
contention will weaken our efforts with regard to achieving U.S. national security and
53. SeeJeremy Singer, Problems Plague SBIRS High Program, SPACE NEWS, Dec. 17, 2001, at 1.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Sam Silverstein, AIA: U.S. Export Law Still Hurting Space Industry, SPACE NEWS, Dec. 17,2001,
at 20.
57. Sam Silverstein, Awaiting U.S. Export Approval, APTPIans Backup, SPACE NEWS, Dec. 3, 2001, at 14.
58. Space Commission Report, supra note 38, at 12.
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foreign policy objectives by concurrently providing a window of opportunity to foreign
governments to further impede U.S. industry by enacting their own regulations that amplify
the adverse effects of the U.S. domestic policy and regulations.
2. Federal Aviation Administration
The Office of Space Transportation (FAA/AST), an agency embedded within the Federal
Aviation Administration of the Department of Transportation, administers commercial
space transportation within the United States.59 Pursuant to the Commercial Space Launch
Act, Congress conferred upon the FAA/AST, among other responsibilities, the task of en-
couraging, facilitating and promoting commercial space launches by the private sector.60
a. Notice of Proposed Rule-Making on Licensing and Safety Requirements for Launch
In the past few years the FAA/AST has made clear its intent to take a more assertive and
visible role than it has previously with regard to its involvement with the technical on-range
activities conducted by U.S. launch providers, culminating in the agency's release of a
Notice of Proposed Rule-making on Licensing and Safety Requirements for Launch in
October of 2000 (NPRM).61 The NPRM's stated intent was to amend existing regulations
and to codify the license application process for launch from a non-federal launch site, as
well as the safety requirements for launch operators in connection with launches from both
federal launch ranges and non-federal launch sites.62 In June, five of the major U.S.-based
launch service providers submitted a joint response to the NPRM subject to the FAA/AST's
jurisdiction. The joint industry response addressed substantial concerns raised by the
NPRM. Specifically, the level of detail of the requirements, the ability to "grandfather"
existing launch vehicle designs under the proposed regulations, the additional requirements
imposed over those in the existing Range Safety Requirements document and the potential
cost impact of implementing the NPRM were challenged by the launch service industry.63
As a result, the FAA/AST withdrew the NPRM, noting its intent to release a supplemental
NPRM on the same subject matter but addressing the concerns raised by the industry
representatives.
b. Indemnification and Risk Allocation Regime
The Commercial Space Transportation Competitive Act (CSTCA), passed in 2000, re-
quires the FAA to submit a report to the U.S. Congress on or about May 1, 2002, addressing
a number of issues relating to the U.S. commercial space transportation industry.64 The
report is intended to provide Congress with data and information regarding the appropri-
ateness and efficiency of the current risk-sharing arrangements as they relate to commercial
launches and re-entries. 65 In its continued efforts relating to preparing its report, the FAA
59. See generally the AST Web site, http://www.ast.faa.gov.
60. Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, 49 U.S.C. § 70103(b)(1) (amended 2000).
61. FAA Licensing and Safety Requirements for Launch, 14 C.F.R. pt. 413, 415, 417 (2000).
62. Id.
63. The launch service providers who participated in the joint submission were The Boeing Company,
International Launch Services, Inc., Lockheed Martin Corporation, Orbital Sciences Corporation and Sea
Launch Company. The Consolidated Industry Submission was submitted to the FAA docket in June 2001,
after the FAA/AST granted a 60-day extension for responses to the NPRM to be submitted.
64. Commercial Space Transportation Competitiveness Act, 114 Stat. 1751 (2000) (amending 49 U.S.C.
70112).
65. Id.
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held a number of public hearings during 2001 requesting views and comments regarding,
among other things, whether the U.S. Government should continue to provide assurance
of financial risk-based support beyond insurance that launch service providers subject to
FAA jurisdiction are required to obtain.66
Currently, the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as amended (CSLA), provides for
U.S. Government indemnification for amounts that exceed a minimum insurance coverage
level. This indemnification provision holds a current sunset date of December 31, 2004.
The risk allocation regime, as established under the CSLA, is critical to ensuring the com-
petitiveness of the U.S. launch industry as against other foreign launch service providers.
Due to the nature of the industry, all foreign launchers benefit from government-sponsored
liability and risk-sharing arrangements. New entrants to the industry over the last decade
likewise receive endorsement from their governments via government-sponsored risk-
sharing regimes.
67
A prime example of the arrangements' commercially competitive effectiveness to an in-
dustry player is the French launch provider, Arianespace. Despite suffering from a stag-
gering loss for the second year in a row, Arianespace was able to continue touting the French
government's unambiguous backing of the company by provision of an uncapped level of
indemnification, as well as obtaining a significant cash influx from European governments
via the European Space Agency (ESA) for the direct funding of programmatic and opera-
tional activities. ESA's approved funding of 700 million euros was earmarked for the de-
velopment of a new upper stage for the Ariane 5 launch vehicle and financing of Ariane-
space's launch site located in Kourou, French Guiana. 61 In contrast, U.S.-based launch
service providers are being confronted with the requirement of justifying maintenance of
the status quo in support of the FAA's upcoming required submission to Congress under
the CSTCA and concurrent struggles to accommodate transition activities affecting the
administration of range operations and licensing requirements.
E. COMMERCIAL SPACE INDUSTRY
1. Satellites
2001 saw the continuation of the U.S. satellite manufacturing industry's struggle against
market forces driven by a number of factors, including the U.S. Government's ongoing
investigations of both Space Systems Loral and Hughes' satellite division (which was sold
to Boeing Company in mid-2001), ongoing debate regarding the application and im-
plementation of U.S. technology transfer controls as to the industry, the recession's ripple
effects (particularly post-9/1 1) and economic factors inherent in the commercial space in-
dustry as a whole which was marked by weak sales and faltering business gains
and projections.
a. Consolidation and Market Access Trends
Partially in response to continuing global economic struggles, the satellite industry saw
a significant move towards consolidation throughout 2001.69 In March, Societe Europeenne
66. See, e.g., FAA Notice of Public Meeting, 66 Fed. Reg. 18,843 (Apr. 11, 2001).
67. Such new entrants include China, Russia, Japan and Australia. Each of the emergent risk-sharing regimes
incorporate the respective government's commitment to payment of claims as a centerpiece in a form that is
comparable to or even better than what is offered under the CSLA.
68. Peter B. de Selding, Ministers Give ESA Most of What it Wanted, SPACE NEWS, Nov. 19, 2001, at 8.
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des Satellites (SES) of Luxembourg announced a $4.3 billion acquisition of GE American
Communications, Inc. (GE Americom). The deal was finalized in November, and resulted
in the world's largest satellite fleet as a result of SES's efforts to merge satellite operators
throughout Europe, the United States, Asia and Latin America. 0
October saw the announcement of EchoStar Communications Corporation's triumph
over News Corporation of Australia in successfully bidding for California-based Hughes
Electronics Corporation (HES) in a $26 billion deal. The merger of EchoStar and HES
would result in a single direct-to-home satellite television provider for Northern America.
Critics immediately challenged the proposed merger as an anti-competitive effort, resulting
in a monopoly.
In May, the Mexican government announced its intent to grant its first concessions en-
abling foreign satellite operators with Mexican partners to offer a variety of space-based
services, including video, data transmission and Internet connections. "We are going to
grant concessions for satellite brokers in Mexico of U.S. partners to use satellite capacity
from the U.S.," said Jorge Alvarez Hoth, deputy communications minister.7' Mexico's in-
cumbent satellite operator, Satellites Mexicanos SA (Satmex), was privatized in 1997 and
remained the only satellite services provider in Mexico despite a satellite reciprocity agree-
ment between the United States and Mexico signed that same year. With the Mexican
government's holding of 25 percent, the remainder of Satmex is partly owned by New
York-based Loral Space & Communications Ltd. and controlled by Mexico's Autrey fam-
ily. 2 In addition to allowing the beaming of services via foreign-owned satellites, Mexico
also announced its intention to auction another satellite orbit-seventy-seven degrees West,
which covers the majority of Northern America.73
The year 2001 failed to bring closure to what was meant to be the vanguard of European
Commission and the European Space Agency (ESA): Galileo, a global satellite navigational
project consisting of a 30-satellite constellation. Galileo was touted as the European Union's
break from dependency on the currently available Global Positioning System (GPS), which
the United States currently controls. The project had received initial funding from Euro-
pean transport ministers. Despite a subsequent unanimous vote of support in November
by research ministries of the European countries involved, on December 7 the transport
ministers of those same countries placed the project in jeopardy by refusing to endorse it.14
Both ESA Director-General Antonio Rodota and France's research minister, Roger-Gerard
Schwartzenberg, voiced the belief that some European governments' hesitation with regard
to Galileo hinged upon the military applications of the system's planned Public Restricted
Service-a communications functionality of the constellation that would be encrypted for
use by European security authorities."
69. See generally Sam Silverstein, Mergers Equal Big Changesfor Satellite Industry, SPACE NEWS, DEC. 17, 2001,
at 24.
70. SES also holds ownership stakes in Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co., Ltd., Hong Kong; Argen-
tina's Nahuelsat; Nordic Satellite AB of Sweden and Star One of Brazil.




74. Peter B. De Selding, ESA, European Union Relationship Hinges on Galileo, SPACE NEws, Dec. 17, 2001,
at 3.
75. Id.
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b. Remote Sensing
In a year that marked what many believed to be the true advent of commercial remote
sensing, perhaps no other sector of the aerospace and space industry was impacted by the
events of September 11 as the remote imagery business. Following the commencement of
U.S. armed forces activity in Afghanistan, the U.S. National Imagery and Mapping Agency
(NIMA) contractually secured exclusive access to satellite imagery taken by Colorado-based
Space Imaging's Ikonos satellite of the theater of engagement.7 6 The U.S. Government's
approach to dealing with privately-owned Space Imaging and, in effect, exercising shutter
control over the company's remote sensing capabilities by utilizing the power of the purse
rather than regulatory authority illustrated the power of privatization and market forces in
an industry that until recently remained primarily in the domain and power of governments.
As of December 2001, the $1.9 million contract had already been renewed once and was
gearing up for a second extension."
Cypress-based ImageSat International, which launched its Eros Al satellite in December
2000, made its 1.8-meter resolution images available commercially during 2001. In October,
Digital Globe saw the successful launch of its QuickBird satellite, a remote imaging satellite
with the capacity of taking .61-meter resolution pictures-the sharpest remote imagery
commercially available-utilizing a December 2000 U.S. government policy decision to
permit the commercial sale of satellite imagery bearing a resolution as sharp as .5 meters.
India also joined the ranks of nations with remote-sensing capability following its successful
October launch of the Technology Experiment Satellite, with the capability of collecting
images with 1-meter resolution. The fledgling industry saw its share of failures in 2001 as
well. Virginia-based Orbital Imaging Corp., already struggling on the edge of bankruptcy,
saw its OrbView-4 satellite destroyed in a September 21 launch failure.
2. Launch Vehicles
The year 2001 also marked a year in which the launch vehicle and space transportation
industry continued its own struggles as well. The same year that saw continued progress of
Lockheed Martin's Atlas V program and The Boeing Company's Delta IV program under
the Air Force's Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) programs, also saw the expi-
ration of the experimental X-33 program in a highly controversial decision by NASA to
allow the partnership agreement between NASA and Lockheed Martin to expire in March.
Likewise, the X-34 program was also allowed to expire, thus casting into some uncertainty
the future of the United States' Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) program.
As a whole, the launch industry suffered setbacks as a result of continuing overcapacity
and intense price competition. Corresponding decreases in profit margins, along with other
factors that adversely impacted the U.S. players (such as foreign government subsidization
of certain non-U.S. launchers) also affected this sector.7 Delays in spacecraft delivery caused
76. Ikonos was launched in September of 1999, and is capable of 1-meter resolution imagery.
77. Warren Ferster & Gopal Ramam, uf States Consider Buying Spy Satellite, SPACE NEws, Dec 10, 2001,
at 1.
78. The relevance of these trends to U.S. national security are significant: the Space Commission Report
specifically noted that "[mlastery of space ... requires new approaches that reduce significantly the cost of
building and launching space systems. The U.S. will not remain the world's leading space-faring nation by relying
on yesterday's technology to meet today's requirements at tomorrow's prices." Space Commission Report, supra note
38, at 18 (emphasis added).
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by manufacturing issues further hampered market trends. At least eleven commercial ge-
ostationary satellites were delayed from being launched in 2001 as a result of such issues.
A highly publicized failure in July of the French launcher, Arianespace's Ariane 5 launch
vehicle, left two communications satellites in useless orbits. The failure marked the vehicle's
third failure in ten launches. The failure led to the suspension of the Ariane 5 program for
over six months, and resulted in the downstream effect of increased insurance costs for the
entire industry that were even further exacerbated by the events of September 11.
a. Competitiveness/Industry Trends
International partnerships, both contemplated and realized, continued to dominate the
commercial sector. In February, Boeing Company and Sea Launch announced their inten-
tions to merge their marketing functions under a new entity: Boeing Launch Services. The
structure mirrors the successful structuring and marketing approach of another U.S.-based
launch services provider, International Launch Services, Inc. (ILS). ILS, formed in 1995
and based in McLean, Virginia, jointly markets the Atlas launch vehicle built by Lockheed
Martin and the Proton and Angara launch vehicles built by Khrunichev State Research and
Production Space Center and RSC Energia. The same year also saw Alliant Techsystems
Inc. acquire Thiokol Propulsion, combining the two largest U.S. manufacturers of solid
rocket motors.
b. New/Emergent Launch Vehicle Programs and Sites
(i) U.S. Air Force Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle. The U.S. Government's military
space launch requirements continued its transition from heritage programs under the Air
Force's Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. The EELV program's ac-
quisition objective is to develop a national expendable launch capability that reduces overall
launch costs by at least 25 percent over current systems without adversely impacting the
reliability and operability of existing systems.
In 1997 the Air Force decided to co-fund dual launch vehicle programs to address the
identified objectives: the Atlas 5 and the Delta 4 programs are continued extensions of the
existing launch vehicle families for Lockheed Martin and The Boeing Company, respec-
tively. Lockheed's Atlas 5 program, which remained on target throughout its pathfinding
and development stage, utilizes the Russian-built RD-180 engine and a significant per-
centage of heritage components from its successful Atlas launch vehicle family. A number
of delays plagued Boeing's Delta 4 program, but the program pressed forward with a target
inaugural flight date of mid-2002. Both programs were given a vote of confidence by Eu-
telsat, which chose to fly as the payload for the maiden flights of both of the new launch
vehicles.
(ii) Angara and Plesetsk Cosmodrome. Russia continued its development of the Angara
launch vehicle, designed to have the capacity to launch payloads weighing up to 28.5 ton-
nes.19 The Angara represents Russia's next-generation of launchers, and is designated to
launch from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome located in the northern reaches of Russia. Russian
authorities have previously announced their intention to withdraw themselves from depen-
dence on neighboring Kazakhstan's Baikonur Cosmodrome, noting that Russia intends to
pull out all launches of its military payloads from Baikonur by no later than 2005.80
79. Viktoria Loginova, Russia to Bring Satellite Launches Home After Baikonur Pullout, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE,
Feb. 9, 2002.
80. Id.
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Currently, the Russian-built Proton launch vehicle program operates from the Baikonur
Cosmodrome launch site.8' The Baikonur site was built in the 1950s, when Kazakhstan was
embedded in what was then the U.S.S.R. In 1994, following the U.S.S.R.'s collapse, Russia
negotiated an agreement with Kazakhstan that leases the Baikonur Cosmodrome for ap-
proximately $115 million annually. The Soyuz rocket, which supports the International
Space Station, also currently launches from the Baikonur Cosmodrome.
E. PRIVATIZATION OF SPACE-RELATED INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The year 2001 also saw the culmination of privatization efforts of the few remaining
space-related international and regional non-governmental organizations that were created
in the 1960s and 1970s. Such efforts commenced over the last decade in recognition of the
advancement of space technology and available access to space. In addition, increasing
competition from private sector entitles evidenced the movement away from a need for
intergovernmental-sponsored and structured monopolies. As a result, the last of the heritage
non-governmental organizations achieved privatization.
In July 2001, after a number of false starts and delays, the overdrawn and congressionally
mandated privatization of the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(IiNTELSAT) finally took place. After thirty-five years as an international treaty-based
organization, what emerged after the dust settled was the formation of a Bermudan parent
company, Intelsat (Bermuda) Ltd., with several wholly-owned U.S. subsidiaries including
Intelsat Global Service Corporation, which essentially consisted of all of the assets and
personnel residing in the same facilities that served as the Washington, D.C.-based head-
quarters for INTELSAT when it retained its status as a non-governmental organization.
The same month also saw the privatization of the European Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (EUTELSAT), which almost immediately turned around after its privatiza-
tion to place a substantial investment in Hispasat SA.
In December the U.S. government agreed to a delay by Inmarsat Ltd. (previously the
International Maritime Satellite Organization) of its initial public offering (IPO) of stock
until December 31, 2002. Inmarsat had executed its privatization in 1999. The extension
was needed by Inmarsat to avoid violating a U.S. law passed in 2000 mandating that In-
marsat conduct an IPO by no later than December 31, 2001 in order to be permitted to
service the U.S. market. A flagging stock market and other negative economic indicators
led Inmarsat to seek relief from the deadline.82
F. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
On February 17, 2000, an intergovernmental agreement on joint exploration of outer
space was signed within the CIS Customs Union. 3 The agreement lays down a legal frame-
81. Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center (Khrunichev) manufactures the Proton launch
vehicle and U.S.-based business unit of Lockheed Martin: International Launch Services (ILS), based in Mc-
Lean, Virginia, markets it. ILS is a joint venture formed by Lockheed Martin, Khrunichev and RSC Energia,
and markets the Lockheed Martin-built Atlas launch vehicle as well as the Proton launcher.
82. In response to Inmarsat's lobbying efforts in this regard, Senator John Breaux (D-La) included a pro-
vision allowing the Federal Communications Commission to extend the IPO deadline in a spending bill that
was passed by the Senate in September and subsequently approved by the House of Representatives and the
White House.
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work for cooperation between agreement members on specific projects. The areas of co-
operation include space research, remote probing of the Earth, science of space materials,
space medicine and biology, space communications, navigation and related technology and
services. In addition, the agreement envisages research, development, production and main-
tenance with regard to automated and manned spacecraft, development of booster rockets
and other space transport systems, providing services for launches and applying space tech-
nology to the economy. On April 26, 2001, the lower house of the Belarusian parliament
ratified the agreement.8 4
G. SPACE TOURISM
In April 2001, sixty-year-old civilian Dennis Tito launched himself into history as the
world's first self-paying space tourist, paying the Russian government an amount roughly
equivalent to $20 million to buy himself a seat on a Russian Soyuz destined to rendezvous
with the International Space Station. Tito was able to pay his way from Russian soil with
the offer of $20 million after NASA refused to negotiate. The deal that Tito, an American,
cut for himself with the Russians for an 8-day visit to the ISS was highly controversial and
nearly escalated to an international tiff between the Russians and Americans, with NASA
finally tamping down its challenges when it became clear that the Russians would not renege
on the deal with Tito. After Tito landed in the deserts of Kazakhstan near the town of
Arkalyk, along with two of his Russian cosmonaut colleagues, he remained unrepentant,
toasting his safe return as "a great day for NASA."s5 Mark Shuttleworth, a South African
native, is slated to be the next civilian, commercial "space tourist" and private citizen visitor
to the International Space Station. He is scheduled to launch aboard a Soyuz rocket in April
2002. Unlike his predecessor, very little resistance was raised on Shuttleworth's planned
visit to the ISS.o
H. OBITUARY: STEPHEN GOROVE
Lastly, the field of outer space law experienced the loss of one of its pioneers in August
2001. Hungarian-born Stephen Gorove joined the faculty of the University of Mississippi
Law School in 1965, and founded the Journal of Space Law there in 1975. Likewise, he
also was instrumental in founding the NASA-funded Remote Sensing and Space Law Cen-
ter there in 2000. Gorove focused in on developing laws to address the uses of outer space
in 1958, a year after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik. Gorove served as a longtime
delegate to the U.N. Committee for Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and also as vice president
of the International Institute of Space Law.
83. The Integration Committee of the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Russia, which was transformed into the Eurasian Economic Community in October 2000, will coordinate the
activities under the agreement.
84. BBC Monitoring, Source: BELAPAN NEWS ACEN cY, Minsk, in Belarusian 1025 gmt (Apr. 26, 2001).
85. Viktoria Loginova, Space Tourist Tito Hails 'Trip to Paradise', AcENCE FR.-PREsSE, May 6, 2001.
86. Natasha Yefimova, Negotiations for Second Space Tourist Go Smoothly, SPACE NEws, Dec. 10, 2001, at 17.
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